A commentary on Yoko Kawaguchi’s paper
“Exploring a Bridge between Hiroshima and the US: Tanimoto Kiyoshi and his activities in the early post war period” “History and Society”

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At the outset I would like to thank the organizers’ of the NASS Annual American Studies Summer Seminar for extending the honour to be on the panel of this very prestigious academic event. I am particularly thankful to Professors Hiroshi Fujimoto, Mariko Takagi Kitayama and Rui Kohiyama for making it possible for me to be in the midst of you all, to be able to learn, share and to exchange the perceptions of America from the different sites of the academia in the Orient.

I must confess that I have been very fascinated by Kawaguchi’s paper—and thankful to her for taking me back to the formative years of my career when we used to teach about the Second World War, the Hiroshima bombing and the post war American involvement in Japan as purely academic exercises. Also to the days when we, as young academics would go about celebrating August 6th as the International Peace Day—being invited to speak on the hazards of nuclear stockpiling. I did not know much—at that time—about the individuals and institutions in Japan and the US- who had worked for the spread of this idea. That a topic that you teach in a class room could have such powerful human dimensions, and that the characters related to causing this human suffering, and the individuals who strived to reduce these—passed and lived through the Indian spaces—came as a real research finding for me when I began a deep reading of Kawaguchi’s paper.

I would like to divide my response to this paper into three sections:

The first section deals with the very theme of this conference “Towards a Common memory of our Past.” In the second section I draw from

Kawaguchi’s analysis of Tanimoto’s efforts to build up the peace movement and peace centres to reify the role of two other very significant characters who contributed to this saga of healing—spiritual, medical, physical and political—John Hersey who introduced Tanimoto to the Western world, and Norman Cousins who shared his ideals, strived to realize these—two American citizens along with
the Japanese survivor of Hiroshima, Rev. Tanimoto who remain as exemplars of a conscious rejection of negativism, in embracing, nurturing and promoting life and all its attributes.

In the third section I briefly bring in the South Asian scenario—if only to emphasize the fact that the search for acceptable memories, the search for a usable past cannot be outside the lived histories of people, as different from the recorded histories of nations. And that reconciliations—if possible—need to be located in the parallel narratives of personal, group and community interactions. The historical facts often lead to difficulties in the construction of a common memory and difficulties in the extension of apologies to move forward, free of the past blunders.

This is done in comparison with the efforts in Japan in reckoning with its historical past before the WWII and after Hiroshima, and the display of American unwillingness—official to date—to acknowledge the sin of causing millions of deaths of the civilians. I deliberately use the word 'sin' as it is outside the domain of world bodies—mostly manipulated by the powerful—to define, refine, redefine or reverse its meaning and implications. In the processes I offer my comments on memory constructions and also deconstructions—either in remembering or in overcoming a past that is both painful and constructive of societies that have been able to sift through the usable and the unusable past to be able to move ahead.

I The Usable Past and the Common Memory

The end of Cold War and the onset of globalization assumes that the international actors locate and adopt fresh mechanisms of interaction free of ideology, independent of history and liberated from flawed perceptions of Security. While trade economy, environment and technology have obliterated the earlier paradigms of international behaviour, these come with the baggage of identity assertions and a kind of neo nationalism that tends to go back several decades before the World War II, to return to the so called ‘roots’ of being. In the emerging interaction of market forces determining the political choices of the policy makers, the reconstruction of memories—national, individual and group—tend to disturb the emerging alliances if these revive historical wrongs. And in cases where there is a limited room for the revival of the memories of historical wrongs, a revival of the historical memories remains mostly an academic exercise.

Does historical memory play an important role in shaping post conflict interstate relations? Some recent studies have attempted to answer this question by drawing from the current theories of international relations. Attempts have been made to explore the origins of interstate reconciliation and to generalize causal links between historical ideas and international relations. However, this has remained an understudied but extremely important subject in international relations.

The key to the realization of deep reconciliation is the harmonization of
national memories between the parties involved. The memory making that comes about as a result of national myth making tends to harm the long term prospect of national reconciliation. The fact that a common memory is essential for the creation of a community has been well summed up by Richard H. Niebuhr, who holds “When common memory is lacking where (people) do not share in the same past there can be no real community, and where community is to be formed common memory must be created. The measure of our unity is the extent of common memory.”

This view challenges the hard core realist approach that draws from power where reconciliation is equated with political, strategic, and military cooperation that should occur when states have common strategic interests.

The concept of deep interstate reconciliation is posited on the assumption that countries share understanding that war is unthinkable and hold generally amicable feelings towards each other. Deep reconciliation is to be cemented by shared short run security needs and also by mutual understanding and trust. Because the existing memories of the past trauma can fuel mutual grievances and mistrust, nations cannot avoid addressing historical memory when searching for a path for reconciliation.

Efforts at conflict resolution rarely address how peace once obtained can be stabilized and maintained. A world without armed conflict need not necessarily be peaceful, and there is always a need to dispel the psychological and emotional shadows of past trauma that could again cause the use of force. Addressing the emotional barriers between nations that separate them through the process of reconciliation is needed to realize peace.

When ideological and strategic barriers between the East and the West receded, ancient bitterness about historical trauma re-emerged as a major threat to international peace. In East Asia there was a resurgence of vivid memories of Japanese aggression of the early 20th century. The lack of deep reconciliation between Japan and its neighbours cast a dismal shadow over the prospects of regional security cooperation. Likewise hereditary feuds have not been overcome by the people of Israel and Palestine, India and Pakistan to attain true peace.

However, it has come in Europe—in the French and German relationship. They formed a Security Alliance, engaged in European integration and even jointly wrote history textbooks. While US and Japan have put the past behind them and established what is described as the most solid alliance of the Asia Pacific region, this alliance is apparently not free from the internal tensions caused by the desire of a section of Japanese elite to break free of the US stranglehold. This became evident recently in the resignation of Japan’s Prime Minister after an unsuccessful attempt to convince Obama and his administration of the importance of accommodating the local sentiments in their continuation of wartime commitments.

In the literature of contemporary international relations two trajectories have been identified to achieve deep reconciliation. First, the surfacing of a common
threat. The realist theory in international relations focuses on external material threats as driving forces in international relations—and this was partly true even during the cold war when only common threat perceptions held countries together. It has regained its relevance in the light of the terrorists threat to open societies. The second emanates from the national myth making theory. The theory contends that not only international constraints but also the domestic political needs and social context can shape the ways in which a nation remembers its past. Once formed, the historical memory can take a life of its own exerting a significant impact on interstate relations.

Myth making is a common practice in political and social life. This involves two basic questions: 1) Why and how are myths of traumatic history made? and 2) How does myth making affect interstate reconciliation outcomes? According to the theory, the ruling elites harbouring special political or ideological goals tend to construct historical myths that glorify or whitewash its own actions, while blaming the other.

However, some questions continue to await academic explanations: why it has been more difficult for China and Japan to bring an effective reconciliation when Germany and Poland have been able to achieve the same? Why did China and Japan quarrel over history not immediately after the war, but only since 1980s when a majority of their citizens had no direct experience of the war and the two countries had normalized diplomatic relations and developed close bilateral economic and social ties? What could be the possible role of culture, religion, tradition and history in the evolution of an ontology of forgiving in a given society?

During WWII, both Japan and Germany had committed horrendous atrocities against their neighbours. Why are the Germans far more forthright regarding their responsibilities for these war crimes than the Japanese? What could be the possible role of culture, religion, tradition and history in the evolution of an ontology of forgiving in a given society? There is no convincing answer as yet in the contemporary academic studies about this.

Also, why Poland has carried a soul searching about its past atrocities against the Jews under the Communist regime and why has China not done it? Why has the Chinese historiography remained rooted in mythology? All this suggests that different institutional legacies in post war Germany and Japan had a particular impact on their respective memory constructions.

A possible explanation of this comes in a recent study by Lim-Jie-Hyun whereas he suggests that an understanding of history has profound impact for international relations in East Asia. Memories of historical events are used by the governments as instruments of diplomacy as well as foci of national identity.

He further elaborates that political policies, historical commissions, textbooks, and education systems come under facts and belong to the domain of hard power. Historical culture is the fact on which all these are based and which belongs to the soft power specially with its hegemony backed by the components
of the civil society.

The prevalence of “victimhood nationalism” can be common to both small and big countries (for e.g. the US during the second Iraq war). It is not confined to weak victimized nations but is also prevalent in victimizing strong nations. It is prevalent not just in Korea and China, but also in US and Japan.

To understand victimhood nationalism and historical reconciliation, it is necessary to register the dichotomy of collective guilt and collective innocence. The historical responsibility should be divided at two levels: 1) People can be responsible for only what they have done, and 2) Younger generations are not responsible for the memory of the past, how the society remembers the past and what our ancestors did to their neighbours. We are not responsible for what has been done, but for the contemporary memory of the past.

We should also avoid the politics of “you should be sorry”. The sacralisation and uniqueness of memory precludes any possibility of shared understanding of the past with others. Every historical event is a singularity, has its own singular character, and cannot be denominated into a genre of history or common history with the neighbours.

Trans-nationality remains an essential ingredient of memory construction. The victims cannot be imagined without imagining the victimizers. Only with an understanding of the transnational circumstances evolving around victimhood can one really understand what this victimhood nationalism is all about.

It therefore appears—as substantiated by several scholarly and popular studies—that the US and Japan have yet to transcend the acts and policies pursued by the earlier administrations in their respective countries to be able to consciously forge a common memory that could serve as a solid base of their bilateral relations and their international obligations. The recent developments in the domestic politics of Japan and the official attitude of the US administration towards Japanese leadership suggest the existence of fault lines that continue despite the durable alliance that the two states have been able to create, retain, and consolidate. It can be said that this has been possible not just due to the configurations of power and security but also due to the existence and nurturing of less visible, more humane interweaving of humanitarian concerns between the individual citizens of the two countries. Individual deeds and group activities of people outside the domain of power leave a more lasting, less contentious, and open ended sites from which the edifice of bilateral relations receives its sustenance. It is not the mega discourses of heroism and bravery, assault and defeat in times of conflict, but the meta narratives of interpersonal, intergroup exchanges, and emotional investments in the continuing efforts to reduce human suffering and pain that appear to have provided the environment in which the security and power dialogues between the two countries have become relevant.

While the Second World War scholarship in different fields of studies have provided the younger generations with enough material to pursue academic careers and research projects in the genre of power and security, it is these
exchanges effected through what has now been recognised as Track Two Diplomacy that calls for attention from the academia.

II Hiroshima, Tanimoto and US-Japan Relations

It is this gap in the literature of US-Japan interactions that Kawaguchi paper attempts to fill in, by addressing the efforts of civilians in both the countries who strived to reduce the pain and suffering of the people affected by the Hiroshima bombing, of the people who remained away from, and above the blame game that followed the conclusion of the WWII. These were the people who introduced the concept of the Peace Day that shook the conscience of the world all over. Their efforts echoed all over the world including in countries like India, where very strong popular protests were held in 1964 for the recalling of Paul Tibbets—the pilot who flew Enola Gay—and was then serving in the US supply mission in the US embassy in India. Also an India, eager to carry on the message of peace and nonviolence, listened with rapt attention to Norman Cousins who toured the subcontinent lecturing on peace and world federalism in 1951 as a visiting lecturer.

I would like to substantiate Kawaguchi’s research by pointing out the fact that Tanimoto’s efforts could not have succeeded but for the fact that he was introduced to the world outside Japan by an American—John Hersey—who himself was unaware at that time that this introduction would lead to a chain of activities that aimed at recovery, reconstruction and revival of lives broken and brutalized by war.

John Richard Hersey’ (June 17,1914-March 24 1993) a Pulitzer prizewinning American writer, journalist, war correspondent and the pioneer of the novel method of storytelling fused with nonfiction reportage, was born in Tientsin China to missionary parents Roscoe and Grace Baird Hersey. His account of the impact of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima published in The New Yorker with the same title in the August 16, 1946 issue, was the first authentic account of the lives of six survivors of the bomb and their journey through the different forms of devastation towards life and hope assisted by American citizens drawn from different segments of society.

Hersey returned to the US with his parents already fluent in the Chinese language that he learnt as a toddler. Schooling was followed by Yale and Cambridge where he got a summer job as a private secretary and a driver for the author Sinclair Lewis, something that he detested. He began working for Time as well as Life magazine and accompanied the Allied troops to Italy to cover the war reporting.

At the end of the war, he was in Japan reporting for the The New Yorker on the reconstruction of the devastated city of Hiroshima. It is here that he is supposed to have encountered a document written by a Jesuit missionary who had survived the atomic bomb dropped on the city. He is reported to have called on him, who then in turn introduced him to the other survivors who are the subject
of his work *Hiroshima*. He then had detailed discussions with the editor of *The New Yorker*, William Shawn, about writing a lengthy account about the bombing of Hiroshima city for the magazine. After the approval of this plan, he returned to Japan in May 1946 spending three weeks, doing research and interviewing the survivors. All this culminated in a 31,000-word article “Hiroshima” which appeared in the August 31, 1946 issue of *The New Yorker* and took up the entire space of the journal. Hersey’s “Hiroshima” shook the conscience of America’s and world’s reading public dragging them out of their cocoons of security, happy consumerism and a certain euphoria of having vanquished the enemy-Japan.

It was through this work that Tanimoto first becomes visible to the world--and was rediscovered by his former colleagues and batch mates from his stay at Emory University. The world looked at this Jesuit priest along with other survivors of Hiroshima who formed the main characters of this work: a widowed seamstress, two doctors, a minister, and a young woman who worked in a factory.

While there is a distinct stream of scholarship around this one single work, examining it as a critique of the consumer culture of the US (the article was bracketed with the consumer iconography of the *The New Yorker* advertisements), as an attempt to “humanize the hated Japanese” (Christopher Craig 2008) as a literary text, as a political commentary, as a morality tract, and so on, my purpose at the moment, is to look at the manner in which Tanimoto is introduced to the readers. It was this introduction that led to his entry into the concerns of voluntary humanitarian bodies, into the sites and concerns of medical research, into the reach of charitable organizations, and into the realm of America’s conscience.

While Tanimoto is almost accused of forgetting the sin/crime of the bombing, accused of not being acrimonious towards the perpetrators of this devastation, accused of being friendly towards the Americans, he is able to convert the disaster, not as a defeat in war but as the enabler of the noble act of dying for the emperor. Several incidents narrated in the book suggest the attitude of the Japanese as one of resignation and/or as a moment that reminded them of their own love for the emperor and pride of being Japanese. This has been well captured by Hersey when he writes about Tanimoto recalling an incident. Tanimoto tells him “of a group of thirteen year old girls, crushed by a fence, who begin to sing *Kimi ga yo, Japan’s national anthem as they die from the weight of the fence*”...yes- people of Hiroshima died mainly in the atomic bombing, believing that it was for the Emperor’s sake. “The extremely damaging propaganda about the Japanese immediately after the war that depicted the Japanese as “savages demons, sub humans and beasts” was countered by Hersey’s sympathetic look at Japanese and destroyed “some of the racist, dehumanizing impressions Americans had of them” (Craig). It identifies them as victims of an authoritarian rule rather than blood thirsty henchmen. Thus, their blind devotion to Emperor underscores the horrors of the Japanese imperial government, rather than the Japanese themselves, and separates them from the ideological and
militaristic forces that had led them to fight to death". In the depiction of other characters too Hersey retains an essentially humane understanding of the situation that helped quell the often irrational hatred towards the Japanese seen in America. The readers were led to understand that "in the disagreement of a community ravaged by war there emerges the bud of freedom".

In her account of the projects like IWPDM and world Peace day as well as the HPC, Kawaguchi divides her paper into three sections each dealing with the career of Tanimoto, his role in making his American friends and colleagues know about the tragedy of Hiroshima and the joint efforts of Tanimoto and Norman Cousins in bringing some solace to those affected by the bombing and making the world aware of the dangers of the use of nuclear bombs.

In the first section after narrating the details of the unfolding of the day’s happenings (6th August) for Tanimoto, she seems to suggest the existence of an inner conflict in Tanimoto that he has refrained from expressing. This works for him, according to Kawaguchi, at two levels, one when he does not heed the call for help from the injured as he is worried about the safety of his wife and daughter and is in search for them. The other is at a political level--or so it appears--when Tanimoto has to contend with the reality that this destruction was caused by a country--the US--that he loved so deeply. In the narrations of the life of Tanimoto before the war and also before Hiroshima, we come across his open declarations of admiration and love for America, calling Emory his alma mater and a second home which is not an unusual sentiment for most of us who have spent considerable time in the US academia sharing the experience of learning, absorbing, and extending the cultural ethos of the other and the self. Considering that he had exposure to education and training in the US, that he had spent several years in the US and had several friends from the university now moved into different parts of the world, the forging of strong emotional links would be a logical thing. Also we need to be aware of the fact that he is a symbol of the confluence of two great spiritual traditions--Buddhism and Christianity--traditions that inherently reject violence and destruction. Born into a Buddhist family he converted to Christianity at 16--despite fierce opposition from his father--that he pursues and adopts as his vocation by acquiring a degree in theology from an American university. While Buddhism would be the base of his oriental identity, Christianity would be the instrument that would help him fulfil his spiritual quest.

The war that brought Japan and the US as antagonists on the world stage had implications not just among the pro-American Japanese in Japan but also among the pro-American Japanese within the US where their loyalty was questioned. We can understand why he would not want to condemn the American action--(this is what is suggested in the paper) when we understand that the people do not go to war--states do--and the states do not always represent the will of the people, or if they do, not so in its totality. Though they are purported to do so, this doesn’t happen all the time. This takes us to yet another level of analysis of
destruction and death in wars. As one of the American members of the Defense Counsel, Major Bruce Blakeney pointed out, deaths in wars cannot be depicted as murders—and the leaders who issue orders for acts that lead to death cannot be accused of war crimes. He emphasized “war... is an act of a nation, not of individuals” and consequently killing in war cannot be charged as murder, and that if killing of Americans was a murder committed by the Japanese, so was the killing of Japanese a murder²⁶ by the Americans. The argument of this dissenting judge was that it is nations that go to war and not the individuals—this debate would eventually lead us into the complex theories of sovereignty, and the limits of political obligations that I would avoid going into. What is important here is to note that the situation in which Tanimoto finds himself after Hiroshima recurs in most countries of the world—including in South Asia—though the severity of the disasters may not be that of Hiroshima. His were the dilemmas of an evolved psyche that was to grapple with the grim realities around him while aspiring for a humane nobility transcending the personal, the national and the international.

About the project of IWPDM, she suggests that for the Americans who supported it, Hiroshima was more a symbol of human annihilation but not an actual city full of human beings. Though it might appear to be so to some of us it would be difficult to comprehend the complex emotions of humiliation, revenge, bravado, hatred, racial superiority and triumph that appear to have motivated the policy makers within the US who took the decision to drop the nuclear bomb at Hiroshima. I would also hold that all the movements and activities about Peace Centers, Conflict resolutions and International Peace Day—in fact the very genesis of the post WWII Peace Movements all over the world were triggered by one single event of the bombing of Hiroshima. The earlier wars of history were not concluded by the use of an atomic bomb. The appeal and impact of this event surpassed all that went before and absorbed the intellectuals and world leaders cutting across the victors and the vanquished, including those of Mahatma Gandhi, Bertrand Russel, Pearl S. Buck, Albert Schweitzer and Norman Cousins to name just a few.

Norman Cousins is introduced in the last section of the paper. Kawaguchi introduces him as yet another catalyst who complemented the mission of Tanimoto by sharing his vision and contributing to Tanimoto’s mission with his own intellect, commitment, time and money and emotion.

Norman Cousins could be truly described as a giant of an intellectual with as wide a canvas of interest as the concerns of humanity.²⁷ A journalist, a war correspondent, a public intellectual, a profounder and practitioner of alternative therapy, a survivor and a liberal humanist, he encompassed and represented all that the American perpetrators of Hiroshima lacked and yet he was one of the most distinguished of the American citizens.

Beginning with his article published only 12 days after the second atomic bomb at Nagasaki, Modern Man is Obsolete in an Editorial in Saturday Review of Literature, Norman Cousins’ support to the cause of the Hiroshima Maidens and
the orphaned children has been well documented for me to repeat here, so has been his support for the Ravensbrueck Lapins, 35 Polish women who had been the victims of medical experimentation at WWII Ravensbruck concentration camp. He worked at different and almost all possible levels within his reach to spread the awareness of the futility of war. For he held the view that “war is an invention of human mind. The human mind can invent peace with justice.”

His concern for the victims of Hiroshima became quite personal. He appealed for funds from the readers of Saturday Review of Literature for the medical treatment in US for 24 young Japanese women who came to be known as the Hiroshima Maidens. His partner in this mission was Tanimoto who worked relentlessly to supplement this with the help from institutions from within Japan. His readers also supported his cause for the care of 400 Japanese children orphaned by the atomic bomb. In 1950, Cousins and his wife legally adopted one of the maidens who stayed back in the US.

Driven by the shock and ravage of Hiroshima he worked to combat unchecked nationalism, advocate world federalism and believed in building a world leadership. He founded in 1957 in the US a national committee for Sane nuclear policy--SANE and was a recipient of the Niwano Peace Prize from a Buddhist group for his efforts to make nuclear disarmament a universal goal.

In the conclusion of her paper, Kawaguchi suggests that Tanimoto and “his activities ... contest the national framework of memory making process about Hiroshima bombing.” If Tanimoto's silence to condemn America for Hiroshima--despite a lifetime devoted to serving the humanitarian and spiritual needs of his fellow citizens can warrant this comment, then we would be casting aspersions on Norman Cousins' patriotism when he wrote to his daughter Sara, “I would like--given the concerns that have dominated my work these past thirty years--for my ashes to be scattered over Hiroshima..... I realise that there may be sensitivities for you on this point, but I hope you will agree given my philosophical bent, this is an appropriate and acceptable choice”.

III The Memory and History Debates in South Asia

As I mentioned earlier, the controversies about the construction, deconstruction and the forging and dislocation of historical memories are not peculiar to the states in East Asia. States that have emerged as a result of violent conflicts among diverse groups of people of former colonies, states that have been the result of the disintegration of former mega powers, or former totalitarian states have always found it difficult to select, nurture and institutionalise a memory that would be inclusive and acceptable to all its components. Often, the process of the construction of memories tends to be a conscious act of inclusion and exclusion. However, while the official symbols of memory may become the sites of celebrating consciously remembered events and episodes, the residuary history lingers in people’s memories, unfettered by the constraints of theory, international
politics and fear. In South Asia, the three significant states of the South Asian land mass—India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, that shared a common history until 1947 have indulged in selections, rejections, adoptions and negations of historical events in conformity with the official stances of the concerned state. For example sections of people in India remember the partition as the vivisection of the motherland, whereas in Pakistan the same event is celebrated as the birth of a new state and a legitimation of the claims to a separate identity. In the political imaginary of Bangladesh, the lines that separate the oppressor and the liberator are frequently blurred depending upon who is the constructor and the custodian of national memory. Yet, these three states plod on, fighting local wars, possessing nuclear weapons (two of them have these) accusing each other of fomenting domestic troubles, and also sharing international platforms, exchanging smiles and gifts, their leaders smile away for photo ops. Nevertheless, the non-official efforts at memory construction continue deriving from the lived experience of the peoples at times complementary to the official versions and at other contradicting these constructions.

To return to her paper, Kawaguchi concludes by stating that “Tanimoto and his activities contest the national framework of memory making process about the Hiroshima bombing”. However, she does not tell us about that framework or its ideological underpinnings which is imperative for any understanding of the current memory construction project in Japan. Similarly, while narrating the Tanimoto story with passion she fails to give proper space to the contributions of Hersey, Cousins and a host of others who are mentioned only in passing. The moral and the spiritual anxieties of Tanimoto as a survivor and a witness would not have fructified in the international movements but for the support he received from the international community. Nevertheless, her presentation, free of academic jargon and complex theories asks us to look for solutions to the complicated problems of present day humanity in the intercultural relations of ordinary people with values and conscience.

“...What has kept the world safe from the bomb since 1945 has not been deterrence, in the sense of fear of specific weapons, so much as it’s been memory--the memory of what happened at Hiroshima.”

Notes

1. There has been no official expression of regrets made in the United States regarding the dropping of the nuclear bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The nearest expression—not exactly an apology—was a display of the moral responsibility in a speech by President Barak Obama in Prague on April 5, 2009, when he dedicated himself to a “world without nuclear weapons”. President Obama also acknowledged—and was the first US President to do so, in a semi apologetic spirit—and said that the US had a moral responsibility to act “as a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the
United States has a moral responsibility to act". Emphasizing the need for nuclear disarmament he said, “we can not succeed in this endeavour alone, but we can lead it, we can start it". However this engagement with a world without nuclear weapons was tempered, if not nullified, with a heavy dose of realism when he said, “I am not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly-perhaps not in my lifetime”.

www.whitehouse.gov/...Remarks by President BarakObama in Prag-As. delivered. released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary.

2. See the following:
   Mark Selden, “Nationalism, Historical Memory and Contemporary Conflicts in Asia Pacific”, Mark Selden’s ZSpace Page, August 7, 2006, and, “Japan, the United States and Yasukuni Nationalism: Historical Memory and the Future of Asia Pacific”, Mark Selden’s ZSpace Page, September 28, 2008.


4. ibid.,
5. ibid.,
10. ibid.,
11. Craig, opcit.,
12. ibid.
13. ibid.
14. ibid.
16. See for more details the Address of the Consulate General of Japan in Houston www.houston.us.emb-japan.go.jp/jp...page 20070302-2htm.

18. Biography, opcit.
