Japan’s Foreign Aid, Human Security, and Traditional Security

David M. Potter

Introduction

In the last two decades the Japanese government has deliberately redesigned the official development assistance (ODA) program to better meet its post-Cold War security needs. ‘Comprehensive security’ policy, adopted in the early 1980s as a means to use economic and diplomatic instruments to pursue security interests, has been replaced by more direct engagement with security issues under successive peacekeeping (PKO) laws on the one hand, and beginning around 2000 an aid approach based on human security and peace-building. Japan has applied these new approaches in parallel, using its peace-building approach in Asia (Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor, Nepal, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka), the Middle East (Iraq), and sub-Saharan and East Africa (Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Sudan). These approaches have merged, however, since 9/11 and Japanese adoption of the war on terror and its assumptions about peace-building in fragile states.

Soft security in the form of human security and post-conflict reconstruction assistance, and traditional hard security have become more intertwined. These two approaches to the security-aid nexus are not necessarily incompatible, and both are attempts to articulate a more active foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. But they have different logics and implications for aid policy. They also reflect different foreign policy constituencies. Human security is fundamentally about social and economic development and has its origins in the work of Amartya Sen and the application of that work as human development under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme. The use of human security as a foreign policy and foreign aid organizing concept can be seen as an attempt to articulate “pacificism with an internationalist bent” (Soeya 2011, 89) or what Petrice Flowers (2009, 115) has identified “the strategic use of a pacifist identity.” This approach has been associated most closely with former Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo, Ogata Sadako, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, and certain elements of the Democratic Party of Japan. The hard security perspective sees aid as an instrument of traditional security and foreign policy, including defense policy, protection of access to resources and supply routes, alliance maintenance, and even territorial integrity. Thus, it potentially undermines the development focus of human security as originally envisioned by the United Nations. The emphasis on aid as a hard security instrument is
associated with foreign policy revisionists in the Liberal Democratic Party, most notably former prime ministers Koizumi Junichiro and Aso Taro, and current prime minister, Abe Shinzo.

The article first discusses the connections between Japan’s Cold War security and the development of foreign aid as an alternative foreign policy instrument, then discusses how the changing security landscape of the early 1990s induced Japan’s leaders to reconsider the country’s international security role. Second, the article investigates the articulation of Japan’s peacebuilding diplomacy based on human security in the 1990s and growing links between SDF missions and aid as a component of anti-terrorism measures since 2000. Third, it discusses the increasing linkages between aid and traditional security evident since the Koizumi administration.

Cold War to Gulf War

During the Cold War an active security role in international affairs was considered a constitutional and political impossibility. Article 9 of the 1947 constitution forswore Japan’s right to pursue foreign policy through armed force. The creation of the Self-Defense Forces in 1954 in response to American pressure led to the formulation of a minimum defense doctrine that restricted them solely to the defense of Japanese territory in the event of an attack. In its foreign policy Japan adhered to a public policy of demonstrating its peaceful intentions and urging other nations to do the same. Japan’s security policy and development assistance were strictly separated. First, for many years the government tried to maintain a policy of separating diplomatic/political relations with other states from economic relations as a means to ensure access to markets and critical raw materials in the context of Cold War rivalry. Second, the minimal defense interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution kept Japan out of any true collective security engagement until the 1990s, although it made token personnel commitments to UN peace-keeping operations in the late 1980s in Iran-Iraq (1988–89), Afghanistan and Pakistan (1988), Namibia (1989), and Nicaragua (1990) (Heinrich, Shibata, and Soeya 1999, 113). In place of a traditional security option in the conduct of foreign policy, foreign aid became the centerpiece of Japanese diplomacy. From its inception the aid program was seen as a way to promote diplomatic and economic relations first with Southeast Asia then other regions of the world. All donors mix diplomatic and commercial motives in their aid programs, but Japan was distinctive because aid was seen as an especially important foreign policy instrument given its lack of military power. Following the 1973 oil shocks, for example, Japan increased its aid to Mideast countries in order to secure stocks of oil necessary for domestic industry.

Renewed superpower rivalry of post-detente politics in the late–1970s increased Japan’s sense of external threat. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, and the Iranian hostage crisis prompted the cabinet of Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira (1978–80) to adopt a new and broader concept of ‘comprehensive security’. This concept included both military and non-military threats including military attack, disruption of resources supplies, and maintenance of economic and political stability in the international
ODA was identified as a priority tool of comprehensive security. The Ohira government substantially increased aid to Thailand, Pakistan, and Turkey as "countries bordering areas of conflict" and suspended aid to Vietnam. Comprehensive security also provided a rationale for Japan to double its ODA in the 1980s (Yasutomo, 1986, 41–49). Yet, as Samuels (2007, 56–57) argues, comprehensive security favored the idea of economic security and was in fact a deliberate attempt to downplay military security issues.

As it emerged as an economic and foreign aid power Japan came under pressure from the United States to provide ODA to countries important to the Western alliance, South Korea and Indonesia being notable examples (Yasutomo, 48–49; Orr 1990; Kim 1993, 210–213). Burden-sharing and alliance maintenance therefore contributed to security interests of the United States and, indirectly, Japan. Aid projects funded in strategically important states, however, had strictly civilian economic purposes. Japan was careful to refuse aid requests that had overt military purposes. It refused, for example, a South Korean request for a sizeable yen loan directly linked to that government’s burden-sharing responsibilities on the Korean Peninsula. The loan was made only after the request was modified to eliminate direct connections to security policy (Ducke 2002, 87–98). Thus the formal separation between security and foreign aid was maintained even during the Nakasone administration (1982–1987), one of the most openly hawkish in Cold War Japan.

The promotion of international peace and stability through ODA as an explicitly economic instrument became a platform for Japan to play a greater global role as it rose to the position of top donor in 1989. Its drive in the 1980s to become the largest bilateral donor, a position it achieved in 1989 then from 1991 to 2001, should be seen as the development of an alternative to military instruments in its aspirations to great power status (Potter 2007).

The end of the Cold War forced Japan to rethink its security policies. The U.S.-Japan alliance appeared to lose its raison d'être following the demise of the Soviet Union (Tsuchiyama 2000, 146–147). The Gulf War of 1991 further intensified the national debate about Japan’s international security role. The failure of the Kaifu government to pass legislation to introduce a UN Peace Cooperation Corps (UNPCC) prevented Japan from responding adequately to American pressures for Japan to undertake more burden-sharing in conflict operations. Domestically, a mixed sense of impotence and embarrassment led to a reconsideration of Japan’s role in global security. International criticism of Japan for its lack of leadership in maintaining peace and security in the world, despite its US$13 billion to the multinational forces during the Gulf War, indicated that the government could no longer be satisfied with a passive role in international security. Still, the nonmilitary nature of Tokyo’s contributions to international peace and security reflected the broad national consensus that beyond its borders Japan’s comprehensive security policy should be pursued through economic rather than military means (Akaha 1991, 329). There were three central problems for the Japanese government: how to relate ODA to support foreign policy goals beyond ‘yen diplomacy’; how to adjust the U.S.-Japan partnership to new domestic and regional dynamics without revising its pacifist policy; and finally, how to appease domestic criticism about the lack of transparency in aid decision-making.

Japan responded to growing domestic and international pressure for a more active security
role with two different policies. First, it passed the UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Law in 1992 to enable overseas dispatch of SDF troops under highly restrictive conditions. After September 2001, the scope of the SDF’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations has expanded incrementally, gradually loosening restrictions on the use of weapons by the SDF to protect ‘those under their control’, such as troops from other countries, refugees, government officials and personnel from the UN and other international organizations. In consequence, across successive dispatches SDF armament has become heavier (Ishizuka 2005, 63–69; Samuels 2007, 97–98). In practice, operations have been limited to humanitarian relief and post-conflict infrastructure reconstruction.

Second, Japan’s first ODA Charter, adopted by Cabinet resolution in 1992, took tentative steps toward linking aid with political/security issues. The Charter in many ways codified existing aid policy, but for the first time outlined official policy related to security by formulating political guidelines for implementing aid: henceforth recipients’ policies on human rights and democracy, control of excessive military expenditures, and production and transfer of weapons of mass destruction would be considered in decisions whether to provide aid. At the same time, however, the Charter continued a long-standing policy that aid not be used for military purposes. Early quantitative research questioned whether the Charter had in fact changed the basic orientations of the aid program (Hook and Zhang 1998). It is the case, however, that Japan repeatedly used aid sanctions to show its displeasure over overt military activity by China, including nuclear tests and indirect military confrontation with a democratizing Taiwan (Takamine 2005), measures consistent with the guidelines.

The end of the Cold War also opened possibilities for a Japanese security role that met its constitutional limitations on armed response to international events. The 1990s were a decade marked by civil war and awareness of the problem of failed states. These phenomena were variously interpreted as complex political emergencies (Ahmed and Potter 2006) or so-called “new wars” (Kaldor 1995). Humanitarian issues were propelled to the top of foreign policy agendas, prompting military intervention by industrial democracies in humanitarian activities related to internal conflict. This is evident in the number of UN peacekeeping operations authorized after 1990 which increased dramatically after a limited history during the Cold War. While the UN had requested Japanese participation in peace-keeping operations as early as the 1960s, the opportunity for participation increased after 1990, and participation in PKOs provided Japan a politically acceptable way to participate in international security.

At precisely this time Japan’s constitutional constraints on participation in international security diminished and the possibilities for participation expanded, but Japanese policymakers still viewed economic security as a key pillar of Japanese foreign policy making. Public opinion still preferred minor changes in security policy and limited non-combat roles for the SDF in PKOs. Throughout the 1990s the formal separation of peace-keeping and foreign aid remained intact: while Japan might assign SDF personnel and increase ODA to certain countries making the transition from civil conflict budget lines, policy making authority, and decision-making were kept apart. A guide to Japanese participation in PKOs, published in 1999, nowhere

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mentions ODA and limits the discussion of links between SDF operations and development assistance to collaboration with Japan’s generally underdeveloped NGOs (Heinrich, Shibata, and Soeya 1999).

**Human Security and Japan’s Aid**

It has been averred that the idea of human security dates back to early postwar period. But it achieved currency as an international development concept in the 1990s. The *Human Development Report 1994*, published by the United Nations Development Programme, put the concept squarely on the international development agenda. The report’s section on human security began by noting that while security had been theretofore understood in terms of security of the state, most threats to people’s daily lives came from sources other than those that occupied the traditional security concerns of nation-states. The report went on to define human security as consisting of freedom from fear (violent conflict and non-violent threats) and freedom from want (protection from deprivation in the patterns of daily life) and listed seven types: economic security, food security (defined as adequate access to food), health security, environmental security, individual security, community security, and political security. While these are usually understood as issues of national development, the report then pointed out six transnational threats to human security: population expansion, economic inequality, migration pressures, environmental degradation, narcotics trade, and international terrorism (UNDP 1994, 22–41).

The concept of human security involves a fundamental departure from traditional security in which the security of states is the primary subject, instead focusing on threats to the security of individuals. Moreover, it directly links conflict to the problems of social and economic development, and development to issues of non-traditional security.²

Human security proved to be an attractive concept for a Japanese government committed to developing a more active international role while retaining its identity as a peaceful nation. Both prime ministers Murayama Tomiichi (1994–1996) and Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996–1998), representing the left and right ends of the Japanese political spectrum, endorsed the concept. In December 1998 Prime Minister Obuchi promulgated human security as a key concept of Japanese foreign policy that would allow the government to cultivate international political influence in ways that would not contravene Article 9 of the constitution (Sato 2007, 85, 87; Fukushima and Tow 2009, 173). Subsequent cabinets inherited human security as an element of Japan’s foreign policy agenda, and it was formally incorporated as a key component of the new ODA Charter adopted in August 2003. Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori proposed an International Commission on Human Security at the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, co-chaired by Professor Amartya Sen and former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata. It also established the Human Security Trust Fund at the UN, the largest of the UN trust funds and until recently a completely Japanese operation. In 2000, the Ministry of

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Foreign Affairs added a grassroots human security program to its grant aid portfolio. This aid is distributed through embassies abroad mostly for small-scale social development projects.

Human security was a godsend for Japanese aid policy makers because it provided a way to make a contribution to the maintenance of international security without having to engage in the politically delicate tasks of constitutional reinterpretation or commitment to increased military spending. The issues identified in the human security agenda, moreover, are amenable to action through existing ODA programs. Japan’s aid for human security in Southeast Asia has tended to focus on the economic and social dimensions of the concept, notably poverty and economic crisis, rather than on its applicability to organized conflict (Soeya 2005; Lam 2006, 2009). The link between human security and civil conflict, moreover, allows Japan to engage constructively in the maintenance of security in its more traditional aspects as well.

The government extended the concept of human security to consolidate peace in conflict-affected countries. Following the G8 Miyazaki Initiative on Conflict Prevention of July 2000, the Government of Japan officially introduced aid policy for conflict prevention to assist reconstruction and development in fragile states. Specific actions for conflict prevention are support for governance, emergency humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction plans, partnership with NGOs, assistance for social reintegration of demobilized soldiers, refugees, and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and regulation and collection of small arms (Potter 2012, 63).

JICA is the agency most committed to the links between human security, peace-building, and development. This shift is visible in JICA’s development activities regarding transition situations between conflict and peace in fragile states or conflict-affected countries. As early as 2001, JICA had published a four-volume report proposing aid guidelines for peace-building in support of human security based on studies of the practices of seventeen other donors (Kokusai Kyouryoku Jigyoudan Kokusai Kyouryoku Sougou Kenkyuu-sho 2001). JICA published its *Thematic Guidelines on Peacebuilding Needs and Impact Assessment* in November 2003, revised in 2011. Together with the 2006 *Handbook for Transition Assistance* it outlines Japan’s procedures relevant to many fragile situations.

In 2003 JICA became an independent administrative institution separate from the policy planning function under MOFA. Sadako Ogata’s assumption of the directorship was critical for the agency’s direction, as she had direct experience with international intervention in conflicts while heading UNHCR in the 1990s, had co-chaired the Commission on Human Security, and had been appointed Special Representative of the Prime Minister of Japan for Afghanistan Assistance. JICA’s operations were reshaped according to the Seven Principles of Human Security to integrate the concept into its activities (JICA 2006, xvi). In 2008 JBIC, which had administered yen loan aid, was taken over by JICA, which now coordinates grants, loans, and technical assistance in an integrated manner.

Over time, then, Japanese ODA both at the country and project levels has become identified with peacebuilding, which according to the Medium-Term ODA Policy in 2005 aims

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to “prevent the occurrence and recurrence of conflicts, alleviate the various difficulties that people face during and immediately after conflicts, and subsequently achieve long-term stable development”.4 Japan endorsed the Principles and Good Practices of Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) in 2003 and in 2010 became a full member of the GHD group. Unlike peacekeeping and peace enforcement, which involve direct military measures, peacebuilding enables Japan to assume an active role in helping fragile states consolidation of peace through provision of economic and social development assistance.

In 2010, following its landslide electoral victory in the 2009 general election, the Democratic Party of Japan issued a revised aid charter. This charter (Gaimusho 2010) largely followed the basic aid policies outlined in previous charters but emphasized the developmental aspects of aid. This was clearest in its emphasis on using aid to help achieve the Millennium Development Goals: in fact, the 2010 DPJ charter was the first such document to specifically mention them. Human security was featured, as was “investment in peace” (heiwa no toushi), essentially a relabeling of peacebuilding. Terrorism, highlighted by LDP governments after 9/11, received only passing mention among a list of global problems to be addressed through aid (the global environment was listed first). In sum, the 2010 charter represented a return to the human development aspects of human security assistance. Lack of political leadership and the crisis of the March 2011, however, left the promise of this re-emphasis unfulfilled.

Hard security

The September 11 al-Qaeda attacks on the United States and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq refocused attention on issues of traditional security. Japan’s approach to human security has proven to be compatible with the U.S.-Japan alliance and the war on terror, focusing on the implications of the attacks for Japanese security. The human security agenda was undermined by Bush administration security policies and allied intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is also true of Japan; the Koizumi administration downgraded human security from a key foreign policy pillar to simply a basic principle of ODA (Edstrom 2011). After 2001, human security continued to inform Japanese development assistance but aid also began to be used as a tool of counter-terrorism, an issue that straddles the demarcation between hard and soft security.

The 2003 New ODA Charter, enacted by cabinet resolution in August 2003, reflected this thinking about the link between development aid and security. First, the charter stipulated that aid should be used to promote Japan’s security and prosperity, the first time such a document explicitly referred to the pursuit of national interest. Second, two of the four priority issues identified as targets of aid directly address security concerns. The second, addressing global problems, specifically mentions four issues (out of seven) that directly concern Japan’s security:

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terrorism, disasters, drugs, and organized crime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic Cooperation Bureau, 2003). In 2006, under the leadership of foreign minister Aso Taro, the annual ODA white paper added piracy to the list. Peace-building is included as the fourth issue to be addressed.

The government of Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006) and its successors pushed the security-aid nexus. The second chapter of the 2002 Diplomatic Bluebook focused on the September 11, 2001 multiple terrorist attacks on the United States and expressed Japan’s solidarity with its ally in combating international terrorism. Emergency assistance, reconstruction aid for Afghanistan, and aid to surrounding countries were included among the government’s countermeasures, and the chapter highlighted Japan’s leadership in hosting the international donor’s meeting on the reconstruction of Afghanistan and its provision of refugee aid and reconstruction assistance. The Bluebook stressed Japan’s cooperation with the U. S against terrorism.

As part of strengthened efforts to cooperate with neighboring governments in combating terrorism and piracy, the Koizumi government stepped up ODA for police training in Southeast Asia. More significantly, it established a special anti-terrorism grant aid program, providing shipping surveillance and information system improvement aid to Cambodia and the Philippines. Since 2006, both loan and grant aid have been allocated to fund provision of refitted Japan Coast Guard patrol boats to Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Djibouti, prompting amendment of Japanese policy on export of armaments (Gaimusho, 2007; Samuels, 2007, 80; Manila Bulletin August 4 2014, B12). While Coast Guard vessels are classified as police equipment and not military armament (to date vessels provided as grant aid are retrofitted to remove weapon mounts and excess armor plating before transfer to the recipient government), their role in Japan’s maritime security is clear.\(^5\) In 2014 Japan agreed to provide Coast guard patrol vessels to the Philippines (via loan aid) and Vietnam (via grant aid). The fact that both countries are experiencing diplomatic and low-scale military confrontation over disputed territory in the South China Sea has been lost on no one (Manila Bulletin 2014, B12); in the Philippines case planned training would be provided by the United States (Philippine Star December 16, 2014), a country with which the Philippine government is renewing its military ties in light of concern over China’s growing maritime power. As of this writing the government is considering providing a similar package of police training and patrol vessels to Sri Lanka.

Provision of Coast Guard patrol ships has not been limited to Southeast Asia. In 2009 the Maritime Self-Defense Forces began to participate in international patrols in Arabian Gulf and western Indian Ocean designed to curtail harassment of shipping by pirates based in Somalia. The distance from Japan induced the government to establish a base in Djibouti, first borrowing space on a French installation and then independently, marking the first time since World War II that it had established such facilities overseas. In addition to increasing development assistance to Djibouti (from a very modest base) in August 2013 the Abe government announced it planned to provide patrol ships to support Djibouti’s coast guard

The Koizumi government also actively supported reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the American-led global war on terror. Both of these conflicts represented U.S.-led military attacks against established governments and therefore a return to traditional warfare and away from the peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction approaches developed in the 1990s. Between September 2001 and July 2003 the Koizumi government passed three laws that enhanced Japan’s ability to respond to terrorist threats or other emergencies. The last, the 2003 Iraq Special Measures Legislation, provided for SDF dispatch to Iraq without a UN peacekeeping resolution, a significant departure from previous SDF dispatches (Shinoda 2007, 86–132).

**Afghanistan**

Following the US-led overthrow of the Taliban government in 2001 and the Bonn Conference devoted to a new political arrangement, Japan hosted the International Conference on Assistance and the Reconstruction of Afghanistan in Tokyo in 2002, at which international donors pledged more than US$4.5 billion. In addition to a substantial pledge of ODA, Prime Minister Koizumi used the statutory authority of the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law to order the dispatch of Air Self-Defense Force transport planes to deliver relief supplies to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. He also sent Maritime Self-Defense Force ships to the Indian Ocean to provide rear-area logistical support for U.S. forces, an operation that lasted until 2009.

Japan increased its aid to the new government of Afghanistan substantially following a period when it had provided practically none. Amounts have fluctuated and been restricted to grants, as Afghanistan’s level of economic development makes it ineligible for loans. Aid between 2001 and 2010 amounted to 24.9 billion yen (about US$290 million). In 2009 Japan pledged up to $5 billion over five years to support Afghan reconstruction. By the end of the decade, then, Afghanistan was one of the top ten recipients of Japanese ODA, most of it in the form of grants and allocations to United Nations development agencies.

As mentioned above, by 2001 JICA had formulated proposed guidelines for peacebuilding aid. These included a framework for providing short-term humanitarian assistance, refugee assistance, and long-term reconstruction aid, which has clearly informed Japan’s aid to Afghanistan. Aid is divided into three overarching categories: governance, security reform, and reconstruction. Governance projects included support for government revenues, elections, and census-taking. Reconstruction projects, which receive the largest of funding, have focused on economic and social infrastructure but also include refugee and IDP assistance.

Security reform, the second most important category in terms of aid amounts, demonstrates how far Japan has come in developing a menu of security-related aid activities. It has been a leading country supporting the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, carrying out projects for demining, the disbandment of illegal armed groups, and police reform through the construction of border posts and training and financial assistance for police (DAC Guidelines 2005, 44; Nihon no Tai-Afuganisutan ODA Jisseki 2011, 22–23;
Beginning in 2007, Japan supported Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), involving cooperation between aid agencies, NGOs, and NATO troops, a first for Japan. As of late 2011 Japan had dispatched four civilian personnel to a Lithuanian-led PRT and supported 16 PRT social development projects with grassroots grant aid (Mingun Kyoudou no Fukkou Shien to ha Chian Iji ni Juten 2011, 20).

**Iraq**

Japan’s involvement in the Iraq War marked a significant point in the securitization of its aid. As a member of the United States-led “coalition of the willing”, it provided both economic development aid and military support. As soon as the war began in 2003, the Koizumi government moved to enact special legislation to send SDF contingents without a UN PKO mandate. Japan committed ground and air forces to the multinational effort in rear-echelon support roles, the former deployed to Samawah, al-Muthana Province until 2006 and the latter providing airlift support between Baghdad and Saudi Arabia until 2009. It also committed significant amounts of aid, a billion dollars a year or more through 2007, to a country with which it had had practically no prior aid relationship. In November, 2005, as part of Paris Club negotiations, it agreed to write off up to $7.6 billion of Iraq’s official debt to Japan, equivalent to two-thirds of its net ODA for that year.

ODA and SDF support overlapped to a degree never seen previously. As with prior cases, budget lines were kept separate. ODA, however, clearly supported the SDF presence. While Japan provided aid to most populated parts of the country, the Samawah area accounted for the largest number of projects (Potter 2006, 462–463). Furthermore, aid and the SDF cooperated at the operational level. A staff of fifty MOFA officials coordinated ODA and SDF efforts, a policy the government called “two wheels of one cart” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007, 8). Air SDF transports carried aid personnel (including NGO staff) and supplies in and out of Baghdad due to the hazardous conditions in the country.

Since 2006 one can discern a clear attempt by revisionists to redefine Japanese foreign policy in more robust terms, including the use of ODA. Koizumi’s successor as prime minister, Abe Shinzo, upgraded the Japan Defense Agency to the status of Ministry of Defense in late 2006 before faltering and resigning from office a few months later. Japan’s participation in the war on terror reached a new rhetorical plane in late 2006, when then-foreign minister Aso Taro called for an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” running from Japan to Iraq. Aso announced that “striving to create affluent, stable regions grounded in such universal values as freedom and democracy is a new pillar of Japanese diplomacy” of which peacebuilding is an important part (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007, 2). Clearly a reply to the Bush administration’s policy of transformational diplomacy, the statement was featured in the 2006 ODA white paper. It is unclear how Japan could realize such a policy, and it disappeared with the fall of the Aso government in 2009 and its replacement by the Democratic Party of Japan.\(^6\)

\(^6\) For an assessment of Japan’s aid for democratization see Ichihara (2013).
mundanely, the annual White Paper on ODA was retitled Japan’s International Cooperation after 2007, allowing a focus on ODA activities while providing flexibility to deal with issues such as PKOs or international emergency assistance in which the SDF plays a critical role.

The second Abe cabinet, inaugurated in December 2012 following the LDP’s crushing defeat of the DPJ in lower house elections, is in the process of strengthening the links between foreign aid and the national security apparatus. Abe, associated with the “non-apology” school of revisionist nationalists (Kawashima 2003), has pushed for revision of Article 9 to remove restrictions on the use of military force and revision of the foreign aid program at the same time under the banner of pursuing a “positive contribution to international peace”. This contribution requires two changes in current foreign policy. The first entails relaxation of legal restrictions on participation in collective self-defense, for many years interpreted as outside the purview of admissible activity under Article 9, and collateral relaxation of restrictions on SDF participation in PKOs. The second entails closer linkage between the SDF and ODA.

Both of these measures were advanced in 2014. In the spring and early summer Prime Minister Abe initiated a debate among the LDP and allied political parties (notably the Komeito) on reinterpreting Article 9 to allow for collective self-defense operations with “close” countries (meaning at this point the United States). A cabinet resolution agreed to on June 30 did just that. The text of the resolution, moreover, pointed out the positive role of SDF activities under PKO auspices as a contribution to international peace.

In April Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio convened an advisory committee to revise the 2003 ODA Charter. News reports noted Kishida’s active role in the deliberation process; the Japan Times observed that a new charter would allow Prime Minister Abe to put his imprimatur on the aid program (Aoki 2014, 3). In a speech timed to begin the process Kishida looked over the past 60 years of Japan’s foreign aid. Much of the speech reiterated prior policy, especially about the positive economic and social development impacts of aid. Human security was listed among the characteristics of Japan’s ODA. Kishida also stressed, however, the hard security dimensions of aid: “The achievements of ODA are not limited to the economic realm. The oceans in Southeast Asia, including the Strait of Malacca and Singapore Strait through which over 80% of Japan’s crude oil imports pass, are important transportation channels that support the prosperity of Japan as well as of the entire international community. With Japan’s cooperation, this region has registered stable development. I believe this also has immense significance in the security context.” Further on, he asserted that “ODA must evolve to ensure peace, stability, and security” as a bedrock of economic development (ODA Policy Speech 2014).

The advisory committee reported to the Cabinet in late June, just at the time of the cabinet resolution reinterpreting Article 9 as permitting collective self-defense. The final experts’ report, ODA Taikou Minaoshi ni Kansuru Yuushokusha Kondankai Houkokusho, took a decidedly realist view of the current international situation, noting that while globalization is proceeding the number of transnational problems, many of them security threats or other calamities, raise the risks for Japan’s stability. Noting that Japan is a peaceful country, the report, in the section of Japan’s foreign policy, juxtaposes human security and the new positive contribution to international peace as components of both national security strategy and
contributions to international peace, stability, and prosperity.

The report is careful to state that as a peaceful country, Japan’s basic aid principles should include pursuit of peace through non-military means and a human-centered approach that emphasizes human security and respect for human rights (as well as self-effort and use of Japanese development experience). Nevertheless, the report sees the new charter as an expansion of aid beyond the scope of peacebuilding to include its use as a solution for security issues such as maritime security, terrorism, transnational crime, and cybercrime. Some of these are issues raised in the 2003 charter, but the emphasis is stronger in the new proposal. Moreover, the section on aid allocation guidelines calls for strengthening of the linkages between emergency aid and humanitarian organizations, specifically between aid and PKO operations. This latter is qualified by the need to keep aid from being used for military purposes.

In addition, Asia in the 2014 iteration is dropped as the primary geographical target of aid. While this was already an anachronism in the 2003 charter, the decision not to specify a favoured region allows aid to be targeted where necessary, including for traditional security reasons.

Finally, the report’s revised suggestions for aid allocation guidelines bear attention. Five guidelines are proposed: democratization, rule of law, and respect for human rights; military expenditures, production of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and level of military weapons trade; environmental impact; gender and economic equality; and corruption. Significantly missing is the guideline preventing assistance for military purposes.

Conclusion

Beginning with Cambodia in 1992 Japan began to fashion a limited but active role in international security through PKO participation. The human security debate of the 1990s provided an opportunity for aid agencies to rethink security and the linkages between conflict and development. Since 2000 peacebuilding has been a centerpiece of Japan’s approach to conflict prevention and reconstruction in fragile states. This merging of aid with security in Japanese aid policy may lead to a paradigm shift in development cooperation thinking. As can be seen in responses like the war on terror, however, it can derail constructive thinking about how to assist countries in conflict in favor of donor security concerns.

After 2000 peacebuilding and human security became integral components of Japan’s foreign aid policy. This is a remarkable shift for Japan a country long noted for its passivity in international politics. It is even more impressive because Japan is the only Asian country to have declared the consolidation of peace and human security to be a new pillar in its foreign policy. However, actual aid has not always reflected this political discourse. After 9/11 human security and the traditional hard security agenda of the war on terror converged. The overlap of ODA with PKO activities has allowed Japan a more constructive contribution in the international arena through the human securitization of development but has also increased concerns that Japan is placing alliance and traditional considerations before its developmental
human security agenda.

Japanese aid to Afghanistan and Iraq is influenced most by the traditional security agenda within the framework of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Aid to Cambodia and East Timor demonstrate the evolution of Japan’s thinking about linkages between aid and security while also highlighting the constitutional and political constraints it faced in formulating responses to these countries’ development needs.

Have these changes in Japan’s approach to development assistance affected aid allocations? The inclusion of Iraq among Japan’s top ten recipients in the years from 2004 to 2007 (according to DAC calculations it was among the top four recipients) was unprecedented in Japan’s aid history and overlapped the dispatch of the SDF neatly. ODA has responded to fragile states and security concerns such as support for the war on terror.

This leaves Japan the task of clarifying the role of aid between the ‘soft’ human security agenda related and the ‘hard security agenda of the war on terror and intervention in conflicts in fragile states. After 2000, especially during the Koizumi and Abe administrations, the hard security agenda has tended to prevail. Indeed, aid budgets languished as Koizumi concentrated on upgrading SDF capabilities. Moreover, the closest links between aid and security services, Iraq and the PRT in Afghanistan are two examples, occurred under Koizumi or his revisionist successors. If anything, the current Abe government aims to strengthen those links.

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References


Japan’s Foreign Aid, Human Security, and Traditional Security

David M. Potter

Abstract

In the last two decades the Japanese government has redesigned the official development assistance (ODA) program to better meet its post-Cold War security needs. Soft security in the form of human security and post-conflict reconstruction assistance, and traditional hard security have become more intertwined. These two approaches to the security-aid nexus are not necessarily incompatible, and both are attempts to articulate a more active foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. But they have different logics and implications for aid policy.

This article first discusses the connections between Japan’s Cold War security and the development of foreign aid as an alternative foreign policy instrument, then discusses how the changing security landscape of the early 1990s induced Japan’s leaders to reconsider the country’s international security role. The article then investigates in turn the articulation of Japan’s peacebuilding diplomacy based on human security in the 1990s, growing links between SDF missions and aid as a component of anti-terrorism measures since 2000, and the increasing linkages between aid and traditional security evident since the Koizumi administration.